Resources
Perspectives
November 15, 2026
Public REITs: A tale of two worlds
Deborah Smith, The CenterCap Group, and Scott Crowe, RXR
- Deborah Smith — The CenterCap Group
- Scott Crowe — RXR

RE SECURITIES · PREA QUARTERLY · FALL 2026 (print pages 22–26)
MORE THAN MEETS THE EYE
From the top the REIT sector looks placid, characterized by a flat company count and a respectable blended return. Underneath is a sharper story about who has really been winning and who has been left behind.
THE BAR HAS RISEN
Investors now want more from a REIT than the model was built to deliver. With private markets offering so many alternatives, an income vehicle by itself is struggling to clear the hurdle.
INNOVATION IS THE REAL EDGE
The private market has become an innovation machine, from specialized vehicles to REIT tokenization. The real question is how the public REIT can use the considerable tools at its disposal to fight back. And if not — then what?
FROM ASSET VALUE TO ENTERPRISE VALUE
Closing the NAV discount isn’t enough. The real prize is a business the market values for growth and compounding. But how?
The public REIT was built in 1960 and hasn’t moved much since. The market around it has moved a lot. Private capital keeps reinventing itself, out-building the public model and circling the cheapest names to take private. The question now is how a public REIT avoids being next. The answer starts with how it got boxed in.
Why do institutions own public REITs? It’s rarely because they’ve been a star performer. Institutions own them because real estate has a job to do in a portfolio — diversification, income, a little inflation protection — and that job doesn’t vanish in a bad decade. Allocators will tell you they need a real estate allocation, even when recent performance argues otherwise. So the real question isn’t whether to own it, but how. Which vehicle, which slice of the market.
And that sits against why the public REIT was invented in the first place. Congress created it in 1960, tucked improbably into a cigar excise tax bill, with one idea: democratization. The idea was to let ordinary people own a diversified, professionally run slice of the big, income-producing real estate that used to belong to institutions and the wealthy. It handed individual investors two things a single building never could: liquidity, shares that trade on an exchange instead of bricks that take years to sell, and income, enforced by the rule that a REIT pays out at least 90% of its earnings. Access, liquidity, income, diversification was the bargain.
That bargain still holds. So what’s the problem? Everything around it has changed. When the REIT was born, a liquid, professionally run route into institutional real estate was itself the edge. There wasn’t much else on offer.
Today there’s plenty, and the biggest investors now weigh real estate against every other place a dollar can go. The public REIT no longer wins by default. It has to pass two tests: whether it’s a differentiated way to own real estate, and whether it’s a stock worth owning in its own right.
This article holds the public REIT up against those two tests. Here’s the scorecard.

iStock.com/Maximusnd
“[The public REIT] has to pass two tests: whether it’s a differentiated way to own real estate, and whether it’s a stock worth owning in its own right.”
The REIT sector is not what it once was
The public REIT market has been quietly restructured. By Nareit’s count the number of US REITs has barely moved in two decades: about 189 in 2000, roughly 190 today. Yet underneath that flatline the mix has completely inverted. If a property type wasn’t public 20 years ago, it isn’t part of the traditional core. Core sectors — apartments, office, industrial, retail, diversified — were about three-quarters of the market a generation ago. Today they’re about a third of the $1.55 trillion in equity REIT value, and more than half now sits in sectors that barely existed publicly back then: data centers, cell towers, single-family rental, gaming. The count looks flat because those newcomers arrived just as the traditional ranks thinned out through take-privates and mergers.
And the sectors the model was built around? Over the past decade they’ve largely underperformed — not every name, but the group as a whole, on the measures that matter most. Nareit’s data showed apartments returned about 4.5% a year. Shopping centers and malls, 3.0% to 3.5%. Office earned essentially nothing, a breakeven decade, and on price alone, stripped of dividends, it lost money, about $80 back on every $100. That doesn’t mean investors weren’t making money in those same sectors — many were, particularly in the private markets, where more flexible capital and operating models created different paths to returns. Compare that to what else a dollar could do: a money-market fund paid a little over 2.0%, private core real estate funds 5.0% to 5.5%, the S&P 500 compounded in the low teens. The traditional REIT landed between an outright loss and, at best, a couple of points over cash — at full stock-market volatility. Industrial, near 13% a year, looks like the exception, due to a logistics boom wearing a traditional label. And here’s the kicker: the REIT isn’t even the expensive way to own this real estate. The median REIT runs on G&A of about 0.9% of assets, below what a private fund typically charges, and still trailed the private market. It was cheaper and worse. Sit with that one for a second.
For that two to three points over cash, the investor took real risk. REIT shares swing 20% to 30% in a typical year, more than the stock market. The index jumped 41% in 2021 and fell 25% the next; apartments leapt 64%, then dropped nearly a third. So much for the steady, income-paying corner of the portfolio.
Rewind to the last REIT boom, the market that let Blackstone take Equity Office private for $39 billion in early 2007. Back then, public REITs routinely traded above the value of their buildings, with the market paying for the platform, the management, and the capacity to grow. For the traditional sectors, that premium has become a discount: the market now pays for the assets and ignores the enterprise around them, often valuing the buildings alone. This isn’t necessarily a raw deal for shareholders, as it can read like a growth story rather than a loss. Buy in cheap, sell a little less cheap, and still come out ahead.
The pain lands on the company. Below the value of its own real estate, a REIT can’t raise equity to grow without selling shares for less than the assets behind them, diluting the shareholders it already has. So growth gets hard to fund, which is why the traditional names keep consolidating, chasing the scale that might one day turn a discount back into a premium. That’s just how today’s market works, like the old days. But closing the discount shouldn’t be the endgame. The more interesting question is how to make the enterprise worth more than the liquidation value of its buildings.
While the core lagged, the market fell hard for the alternatives, the sectors barely public a generation ago. Over the same decade self-storage compounded in the mid-teens, cell towers, and data centers around 12% a year, single-family rental about 11%. As a group they matched or beat the S&P and left the core in the dust.
So why do alternative sectors command a premium while the core takes a discount? Not safety; they swung just as wildly as everything else. Operational intensity is closer, but it only goes so far. A data center or a cell tower is a more specialized business than collecting rent. Yet office is about as operationally demanding as real estate gets, and it has still traded at a discount, while net lease is hands-off and trades close to the value of its buildings. So intensity can’t be the answer.
The answer is growth. Data centers, towers, and the rest sit on secular waves the traditional sectors don’t have — the cloud, wireless data, an aging population — and growth is what the public market pays for. A company at a premium can issue equity and compound, the very cycle the core has lost. The platform matters too. Many names that have leaned hardest into development, operating scale, and third-party capital have compounded faster than their sector alone would explain.
While it may not be absolute proof, as one can’t confirm a strategy by simply pointing to its winners, it should be taken seriously as a potential pattern. And notice what none of this needs: the public market. Private capital is pouring billions into the very same sectors. The alternatives are richly priced because the public market prices growth, and private capital is bidding for it right beside them.
So back to where we started. The REIT was built to be an income vehicle, and the 90% payout rule is the whole point of it — it forces the company to hand out its earnings rather than pile them up. That same feature is what pins the wrapper down when growth is the game. It can’t retain and compound, and once it trades at a discount it can’t issue equity either. So the income DNA that defines the model is the very thing that handicaps it. It’s a double-edged sword: its original purpose and its current constraint are the same feature. Somewhere along the way the market stopped paying up for the income the model was built to deliver and started paying up for the growth it was built to avoid, leaving the traditional core punished for doing exactly what it was designed to do. Isn’t that something?
The alternatives, in other words, have become growth stocks that happen to own real estate. Investors buy them for the story ahead, not the check they write today: the bright future, the compounding, the eventual exit. A data center REIT yields almost twice the broad market, yet only about two-thirds of what an apartment landlord pays out. It’s a strange thing to discover about a vehicle invented for income. And it’s what makes the picture so easy to misread. From a distance the REIT market looks healthy: a flat company count, a respectable blended return, a handful of marquee winners. Look underneath and the sector the model was built on has spent a decade shrinking, lagging, swinging around, and trading below the value of its own buildings. The strength of the alternatives has masked the retreat of the core.

“The alternatives… have become growth stocks that happen to own real estate. Investors buy them for the story ahead, not the check they write today: the bright future, the compounding, the eventual exit.”
So how does a REIT grow when the equity window shuts?
So how does a REIT grow? Not by willing the discount away. The more useful question is how to operate when the promise of equity access — the whole point of going public — simply hasn’t held up. The problem is structural. The REIT is one rigid wrapper up against a private market that keeps reinventing itself, outbuilding the public structure by splitting the jobs the REIT used to bundle together into specialized products, each better at one thing. That doesn’t mean abandoning the wrapper. It means a board can’t just operate its way out of the box. With equity off the table, the growth capital has to come from somewhere. So reach for the patient private capital that’s been eating the REIT’s lunch, and put it to work.
The public market has its own poster child: Prologis, whose Strategic Capital arm oversees roughly $67 billion of other people’s money alongside its own balance sheet, earning fees on that capital instead of ceding ground to it, and trading on a blend neither a pure landlord nor a pure manager could command. Is it a fit for everyone? No. It takes scale, the right sector, real fund-management chops, and a patience the tax rules all but force on the model. Building an investment-management business requires first growing the buildings beneath it — a staircase, where a pure asset manager takes the elevator. That’s why Prologis needed the better part of 20 years, and why a company already at a discount, forced to grow the very balance sheet the discount is punishing, finds the climb steep.
Still, it’s the most credible answer anyone has found: the private market turns from a threat into a growth engine. And there’s more than one way in — joint ventures, separate accounts, recapitalizations, programmatic partnerships, each a way to earn on private capital instead of competing with it. The path only looks narrow if a board insists on copying Prologis brick for brick. There’s a bolder version still: think less like a landlord and more like an operating and investment platform, put its own people, data, and know-how to work across other people’s capital. That’s the harder road, and plenty of boards won’t take it. The ones that do turn the private market from a rival into a supplier.
Of course, the moment a public REIT runs other people’s capital, the first objection we frequently hear is conflict. It’s legitimate, but it’s not a reason to stop. Keep public shareholders the primary constituent — the balance sheet serves them first, then acts as GP and co-investment capital alongside third-party vehicles — and match capital to risk and duration rather than owning the same slice of every strategy. Then make the rules boring, explicit, and hard to game: mandates defined before the money is raised, priority rights where they overlap, objective valuations for deals between vehicles.
Alignment does the rest. Fees and promotes from third-party capital should accrue to the REIT, not to individual executives, and management’s main incentive should stay tied to the share price. Done that way, private capital isn’t a competing business alongside the REIT but another channel for the REIT’s people, data, and capabilities to earn over a bigger asset base. In effect, the REIT becomes a ready-made PropCo/OpCo: a scaled pool of real estate married to the people and systems that know how to source, develop, and operate it, without abandoning its income base. The opportunity is to have the market value both.
And here’s another twist worth watching. Lately a whole raft of public REITs, unable to sell stock into a discounted market, have been selling them privately instead — taking direct placements from private funds at negotiated prices. The private market isn’t just outbidding the public REIT for buildings anymore. It’s stepping in to recapitalize the REIT itself. Preferred, convertibles, structured equity landing straight on public balance sheets. This is capital coming in through the side door because the front door, a plain public equity raise, is shut. Is that a lifeline or a warning? A bit of both. It funds the next deal, but it also signals that the public currency has gotten so cheap that smart private money would rather negotiate onto the balance sheet than buy the shares like everyone else.

iStock.com/themacx
Why care about tokenization?
Which brings us to the newest chapter, and its oldest idea. The buzzword now is tokenization: putting buildings and property funds on a blockchain, sliced into small, liquid pieces anyone can buy. Read that again. Fractional, liquid, accessible ownership of institutional real estate for the ordinary investor. Sound familiar? It’s the exact thing the REIT was invented to do in 1960. Tellingly, the serious money — Securitize backed by BlackRock, alongside Apollo, KKR, and Hamilton Lane — isn’t tokenizing REITs at all. They already solved that one. They’re tokenizing private funds. The frontier isn’t the public market anymore. It’s the private one. And it’s moving fast: Securitize has gone from a few hundred million dollars of tokenized assets to nearly $4 billion in barely two years, and Hamilton Lane cut one fund’s minimum ticket from $5 million to $20,000. It’s the 1960 promise, re-aimed at the part of the market that actually performs.
However, the forecasts of trillions are marketing, not math, and most of what has scaled is private credit and fund feeders, not core equity real estate. And it doesn’t repeal the question the whole piece keeps circling: is that liquidity real, or does it dry up in a shallow market right when it’s needed most? A token on a thin exchange has the same fair-weather liquidity, or worse, as a small-cap REIT. It’s part genuine shift, part hype, all at once.
Where does this leave us?
The REIT was built in 1960 to give ordinary investors what only institutions had: access, liquidity, income, diversification. And by that measure it still works. A slice of institutional-quality real estate, priced every day, paying its dividend. What’s changed is the appetite around it. The market pays for growth now, and the traditional core — the very sectors that still throw off the income the model was designed for — is the part it has stopped paying up for.
A board anchored in that core has two choices. Keep growing, somehow. Or make peace with a permanent discount to what its buildings are worth. This isn’t a call for every REIT to run to the private markets. It’s one question put to every board: could private capital, and not just public shareholders, fund the next dollar of growth? The REITs that answer yes, and hand investors both a real way to own real estate and a stock worth owning, will write the next chapter. The rest will trade at the mercy of a market that has moved on. The vehicle that democratized real estate in 1960 isn’t done. It’s being asked, one more time, to prove what it’s for.
“A board anchored in that core has two choices. Keep growing, somehow. Or make peace with a permanent discount to what its buildings are worth.”
Deborah Smith is Co-Founder and CEO of The CenterCap Group, and Scott Crowe is Executive Vice President, Chief Strategy Officer, and Head of Equity Capital Markets at RXR.
This article has been adapted from remarks at the ULI Spring Meeting, 2026.
This article was first published in PENSION REAL ESTATE ASSOCIATION (PREA) Quarterly, Fall 2026, and is shared with permission.
The published version is here: https://lnkd.in/eF62txWc
